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COMMENTS ON RECENT DECISIONS
operates to transfer the legal title" is a point to be considered. The
cases referred to above were decided in jurisdictions where the com-
mon law doctrine that a mortgage is a transfer of a legal estate to
the mortgagee was in force. Such is not the case in all jurisdictions
today. In some twenty-six states today a mortgage is regarded as a
mere lien, and no estate passes to the mortgagee, at least not till de-
fault and foreclosure; in seventeen states the common law rule that a
legal estate passes to the mortgagee applies; while in three others,
Missouri, Delaware and Mississippi, a mortgage is regarded as a mere
lien till default when an estate and right of entry vest in the mort-
gagee, Thompson Real Prop. 4367. In Illinois, a legal estate vests in
the mortgagee when the mortgage is executed, 4 Scammon 69, 69 Ill.
632, 124 Ill. 32, 186 Ill. 570. That Illinois rule is probably the under-
lying basis on which the court in Hardin v. Wolf, supra, stated that
the execution of the mortgage severed the tenancy, and an influence
which had bearing on the decision in Lawler v. Byrne, 252 Ill. 194, 96
N. E. 892, an earlier decision in which the Illinois court decided that
a mortgage severed the jointure. What ruling the courts would make
in states where the mortgage is regarded as a mere lien is somewhat
a matter of conjecture. The modem aversion and statutes against
joint tenancy and its incidents has caused a dearth of litigation on that
question. However, it seems unreasonable to believe that in states
where a mortgage is a mere lien that the execution of a mortgage
could be a severance of the joint tenancy, at least before foreclosure.
M. L. S.
TORTS.
Davoren et al. v. Kansas City, 273 S. W. 401.
NEGLIGENCE- LIABILITY TO INFANTS- ATTRACT-
IVE NUISANCES. In the recent case of Davoren et al. v. Kansas
City, 273 S. W. 401, we have again the question of liability for injury
to an infant who is upon premises because he was attracted by a con-
dition of the premises. The original suit was instituted in the Circuit
Court of Jackson County by Davoren and his wife to recover dam-
ages for alleged negligence in the drowning of their minor son. The
facts as developed at the trial were as follows: Some twenty years
before the fatal drowning occurred, the city constructed a high fill
or dam across a ravine for the purpose of building a street. The city
did not build a culvert or any outlet for the release of surface water
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which might collect back of the dam. The result was that the depres-
sion rapidly filled with surface water, and for some years a pond had
covered an area of several blocks in a populous part of the city. The
pond was not located on city property, nor was it so close to the street
as to be dangerous to persons using the street. At the time of the
fatal accident the pond was covered with ice, and the little boy and his
brother were playing on the ice when it gave way and both the boys
were drowned. The jury in the lower court had returned a verdict for
the plaintiff. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower
court (except as to the amount of damages). The Supreme Court in
affirming the decision was divided, four for affirmance and three for
reversal. The dissent was on the theory that the plaintiff's evidence
showed no liability upon the part of the defendant. The majority of
the court affirmed the decision of the lower court on the basis that the
pond was "attractive and dangerous" to children of immature age, and
that the city officials should have known this fact, or by the use of
ordinary care should have known that this was attractive and danger-
ous to children and therefore their failure to drain the pond amounted
to negligence toward the child of immature age for which the city
would be liable in case of injury or death.
The counsel for the city in this case contended that in order to
support the action the plaintiffs were relying upon the doctrine of the
turntable cases and applying it to facts such as that doctrine had never
been extended to in this state. Speaking for the majority of the court,
Judge Woodson distinctly denies and repudiates the idea that the case
falls within the doctrine of the turntable cases. He further says that
such an opinion is a "clear misconception of the case." However,
Judge Graves, speaking for the dissenting judges, points out that both
the plaintiff's petition and the instructions of the judge of the trial
court clearly invoke the doctrine of the turntable cases.
In order to best understand how this case compares with the gen-
eral current of authority we shall consider some cases in other juris-
dictions as well as other Missouri cases. In Klix, Administrator, v.
Nieman, 68 Wis. 271, it was held that an owner of a city lot was not
bound to fence or guard an evacuation or pond situated on his land,
when the pond was not so near the street as to be dangerous to persons
passing.
In Lomax v. Reisch, 164 Ill. App. 54, the defendant left an old
cellar unguarded on his land. The plaintiff, a girl of six years of age,
while playing on the land fell in and was injured. Mr. Justice Frost
in delivering the opinion of the court said: "The appellant's liability,
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if any, rests upon the doctrine comprehended in the attractive nuisance
cases, that is, permitting a dangerous condition to exist, unguarded
and easy of access for children, alluring and enticing to the youthful
mind." He further went on to say that this principle was unquestion-
ably the doctrine of the turntable cases and that that doctrine had never
been applied to the facts such as they were in the case before the court.
In Savannah, Florida and Western R. R. Co. v. Beavers, 113 Ga.
398, 39 S. E. 82, 54 L. R. A. 314, it was held that one who makes an
evacuation upon his own land is not bound to so guard it as to prevent
injury to children who come upon the land without invitation, express
or implied, but who are induced to do so merely by the alluring attract-
iveness of the evacuation and its surroundings. The court clearly
states that the case comes under the doctrine of the turntable cases
and that that doctrine is not to be extended beyond its original limits.
In Stendel v. Boyd, 73 Minn. 53, 75 N. W. 735, 42 L. R. A. 288,
72 A. S. R. 597, the court said that a land owner is not bound to fence
or otherwise guard an open evacuation or pond, natural or artificial,
on his land, in order to prevent injury to children who come upon the
land because of the alluring attractiveness of the evacuation. The
Judge pointed out that the case came clearly within the doctrine of the
turntable cases. Many cases have held that a pond could not be con-
sidered as an attractive nuisance under the doctrine of the turntable
cases. Smith v. Jackob Dold Packing Co., 82 Mo. App. 9; Peters v.
Bowman, 115 Cal. 349, 47 Pac. 113, 598, 56 A. S. R. 106; Sullivan v.
Huikekoper, 27 App. D. C. 154, 5 L. R. A. (n. s.) 263; Sthauf v. Padu-
cah, 106 Ky. 228, 50 S. W. 42, 90 A. S. R. 220; Overholt v. Vieths,
93 Mo. 422, 3 A. S. R. 557, 6 S. W. 74; Moran v. Pullman Palace Car
Co., 134 Mo. 651, 33 L. R. A. 755, 56 A. S. R. 548, 36 S. W. 659;
Omaha v. Bowman, 52 Nebr. 293, 72 N. W. 316; Greene v. Linton, 27
N. Y. Supp. 891; Peninsular Trust Co. v. Grand Rapids, 131 Mich.
572; Dobbins v. M. K. and T. R. R., 91 Tex. 63; Thompson v. Illinois
Central R. R., 63 So. 185, 105 Miss. 636, 47 L. R. A. (n. s.) 1101;
Emond v. Kimberly-Clark Co., 159 Wis. 83, 149 N. W. 760.
The foregoing cases are all cases with facts similar to the prin-
cipal case under discussion. They decide that there is no liability
upon the part of a land owner who fails to fenec a pond on his land to
prevent accidents to children who come upon his land merely because
they are lured there by the attractiveness of the pond. There are, how-
ever, a few cases which have held otherwise. In Price v. Atchison
Water Co., 58 Kan. 551, 50 Pac. 450, 62 A. S. R. 625, it was held that
a landlord who maintained upon his premises a reservoir filled with
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water to which children are attracted for the purpose of fishing or
other sports, and who knows they frequent the reservoir for such pur-
poses, and who takes no special means to warn or exclude the chil-
dren, is guilty of negligence under the doctrine of the turntable cases,
and hence is answerable for the death of a child drowned in the reser-
voir. Pekin v. McMahon, 154 Ill. 141, 27 L. R. A. 206, 45 A. S. R.
114, 39 N. E. 484, was a case of a lot in a populous city filled with
water and floating logs. This was held, under the doctrine of the turn-
tabel cases, to be an attractive nuisance to little children, rendering
the city liable for the death of a boy while playing upon the logs in
the pond.
City of Indianapolis v. Williams, 58 Ind. 447, 108 N. E. 387, held
that where a city negligently constructed a sewer so as to make a deep
hole in a stream into which it empties, and children are attracted to
the stream and are drowned, the city would be liable under the doctrine
of attractive nuisance as set forth under the turntable doctrine.
Other cases in which ponds, streams and the like have been held
attractive nuisances under the doctrine of the turntable cases are:
Donk Bros. Coal Co. v. Leavstt, 109 II. App. 385, and Tucker v. Dra-
per, 62 Nebr. 66, 54 L. R. A. 321, 86 N. W. 917.
The cases in this latter group, all tending to support the result
reached in the principal case of Davoren v, Kansas City, were decided
on the basis of extending the doctrine of the turntable cases to the
facts of the respective cases. It must be borne in mind, however, that
Judge Woodson distinctly repudiated the idea that the result in the
principal case was reached by an extension of the turntable doctrine.
The doctrine of the turntable cases has been long recognized and
affirmed in Missouri. In Koons. v. St. Louis and Iron Mountain R. R.
Co., 65 Mo. 592, and Berry v. St. L. Memphis and S. E. R. R. Co., 214
Mo. 593, 114 S. W. 27, recovery was allowed for injury to children
which occurred upon turntables that had been left unlocked. In both
cases the court allowed the recovery upon the attractive nuisance the-
ory and the doctrine of the turntable cases. The Missouri courts,
although definitely recognizing this doctrine in the above cases, have
jealously guarded any extension of the doctrine to anything but turn-
table cases. In Kelly v. Benas, 217 Mo. 1,116 S. W. 557, the court
refilsed to call a high ltmber pile an attractive nuisance. In Buddy v.
Union Terminal R. R. Co., 276 Mo. 276, 207 S. W. 821, the court
refused to apply the doctrine of the turntable cases to railroad cars
standing on the siding. The court in this case pointed out that the doc-
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trine of the turntable cases had been accepted as well settled law in
this state, but the court further pointed out that the doctrine was so
attenuated and fragile in its legal logic that it should not be ex-
tended. In the case of Rallo v. Heman Construction Co., 236 S. W.
(Mo.) 632, it was held that an owner of a vacant lot containing an
unguarded pond is not liable to children playing near by.
From a review of all the cases decided under similar facts to the
principal cases, it appears that the Missouri court has gone contrary
to the general prevailing doctrine in this country, and has certainly
swung away from the previous Missouri decisions. However, the most
interesting thing is not that the decision seems to be novel within the
state, but its interest lies primarily in the reasons assigned for the
result. In every case considered in this discussion, with the single
exception of the principal case, the decision has rested upon the doc-
trine of the turntable cases, and the result reached by the various
courts has depended upon whether or not the court has been willing
to recognize that doctrine and further, whether it has been willing to
extend that doctrine to the facts of the particular cases.
Judge Woodson said that the pond in the principal case was
attractive to children and that the city should have known of its attract-
iveness and guarded against the results that might flow therefrom. We
cannot see how this case does anything but fall clearly within the rule
of the turntable cases. It looks as though Judge Woodson's reason
was nothing more than an announcement of the reasons assigned for
liability in the turntable cases, and yet in the next breath he says that
to apply the doctrine of those cases would be a "clear misconception"
of the principal case. We cannot but feel that Judge Graves in his
dissent is right in his statement that the case falls clearly within the
scope of the turntable cases . From all the cases reviewed, we can see
no escape from Judge Graves' reasoning in so far as the case should
turn on the doctrine of the turntable cases. All the authorities seem to
support him on this point. Whether or not the court wants to accept
that doctrine in the wide scope that the facts of this case would neces-
sitate is not the point with which we disagree. That is a matter purely
for the determination of that tribunal. But it is hard for us to under-
stand exactly what principle the Supreme Court is attempting to lay
down. It distinctly repudiates the idea that it is extending or even
applying the turntable doctrine; and yet we cannot see how the result
can mean anything except that the Missouri Supreme Court has
adopted the turntable doctrine in its widest sense.
H. C. A.
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